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or nearly two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to 
articulate the point at which a punitive damages award is so 
excessive that it violates a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process rights.  In 2007, the Court continued that journey in Philip 
Morris v. Williams,1 deciding for the first time that the purpose of a 
punitive damages award— a s opposed to the amount — could be so 
improper as to render an award unconstitutional.2  In Philip Morris, 
the Court considered whether the Due Process Clause permits a jury 
to base its punitive damages award on the defendant’s harm to third 
parties not named in the suit.  The Court’s conclusion — in effect 
“yes, and no”— i ndicated that a jury may consider a defendant’s harm 
to third parties when evaluating the reprehensibility of a defendant’s 
conduct, the predominant factor in determining the size of a punitive 
damages award.3  The Court concluded that a jury may not, however, 
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1 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
2 Id. at 1062–63. 
3 Id. at 1063. 
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punish a defendant directly for injuries inflicted upon strangers to the 
litigation.4 
As this Comment presents, the distinction that the Supreme Court 
endeavored to draw in Philip Morris is illusory, profoundly 
problematic, and poses greater uncertainties than those it sought to 
answer.  A discussion of the difficulties inherent in applying the 
Court’s novel standard shows that the optimal way to simultaneously 
retain the doctrine of punitive damages and protect a defendant’s due 
process rights is to prohibit a jury’s consideration of nonparty harm 
altogether.5 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of punitive damages 
jurisprudence leading up to the conflict in Philip Morris.  Part II 
discusses the factual and procedural history of Philip Morris and 
explains the Supreme Court’s holding in the case.  Part III analyzes 
the Court’s reasoning and the problems it presents upon real-world 
application.  Part IV concludes this Comment by briefly discussing an 
alternative approach that is both clearer than the Court’s standard and 
more protective of a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause. 
I 
DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Although punitive damages are often the subject of controversy 
and debate, their use to punish and deter misconduct is firmly 
embedded in our legal tradition.6  Historically rooted in criminal 
sanctions, punitive damages first became a civil remedy in English 
common law during the 18th century and were first recognized in the 
United States in 1791.7  Punitive damages awards gradually continued 
to gain acceptance among American courts through the mid-19th 
century, with the Supreme Court in Day v. Woodworth ultimately 
 
4 Id. at 1064. 
5 Within this issue, the terms “nonparty” and “out-of-court third party” are generally 
used interchangeably by both the Supreme Court and its critics.  For purposes of this 
Comment, the terms are synonymous. 
6 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive 
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1993) 
(noting that punitive damages date back at least as far as the Hindu Code of Manu, 
Hammurabi’s Code, and the Bible). 
7 Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 101, 108–09 
(1995) (citing Coryell v. Colbough, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791)). 
 2008] Punitives, Damaged 639 
declaring the doctrine “a well-established principle of the common 
law,” the propriety of which “will not admit of argument.”8 
The Court noted in Day that punitive damages awards were distinct 
from traditional compensatory damages, being based upon “the 
enormity of [the] offence rather than the measure of compensation to 
the plaintiff,” such as in cases “where the injury has been wanton and 
malicious, or gross and outrageous.”9  Today, the reasoning 
underlying punitive damages remains much the same.  Unlike 
compensatory damages, which are intended to redress the actual loss 
a plaintiff has suffered,10 punitive damages are aimed at deterrence 
and retribution11 and arise in part from a state’s interest in punishing 
unlawful tortious conduct and deterring its repetition.12  Punitive 
damages awards thus represent an amount beyond that which makes a 
plaintiff “whole again.”13  As a result of the unique purpose behind 
punitive damages, states today generally impose a substantial burden 
upon a plaintiff before punitive damages are awarded.14  In most 
jurisdictions, that burden requires showing that the defendant’s 
wrongful act was done intentionally or with willful indifference, 
deliberate disregard, malice, or a similar state of mind.15 
Punitive damages, being so rooted in a state’s interest in protecting 
its citizens from particularly harmful or egregious acts, assuredly 
serve some important and popular social purposes.  In recent years, 
however, increasing debate has focused on the size of punitive 
 
8 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851). 
9 Id. (emphasis added). 
10 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979)). 
11 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979)). 
12 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (citing City of Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 350 (1974)). 
13 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (“It should be 
presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so 
punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after having paid 
compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further 
sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.”). 
14 See LINDA L. SCHLUETER, 1 PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.2(A)(2), at 159–62 (5th ed. 
2005) (discussing the pleading requirements and the basis for a claim in a punitive 
damages case). 
15 See id. 
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damages awards, their frequency, and the overall impact they have on 
the legal system.16 
Though views vary widely, that debate predominantly involves two 
concerns.  First, critics fear that punitive damages can be arbitrarily 
imposed, particularly where a jury may not be able to accurately 
discern the culpability of a defendant’s conduct.17  Second, many 
point to the possibility that punitive damages can be excessive under 
the circumstances, either by duplicating the same punishment against 
one defendant in successive trials,18 or by imposing an award “that 
has no relation to reality.”19 
Driven by those two concerns, the last twenty years have seen a 
dramatic change in the jurisprudence of punitive damages review.  
Before the late 1980s, state courts generally reviewed punitive 
damages awards without regard to federal constitutional concerns.20  
Instead, they were guided either by diverse standards of 
“reasonableness” and “excessiveness”21 or by statutory constraints on 
punitive damages.  Those statutory constraints, which most states had 
enacted or tightened by the mid-1990s,22 included heightened burden 
of proof requirements, bifurcation of “liability” and “punitive” phases 
at trial, and so-called “split recovery” rules that direct a percentage of 
punitive damages awards to state funds.23  In addition, it was not 
uncommon for courts to impose their own reductions on punitive 
damages awards during post-trial proceedings through the common-
 
16 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1405, 1405–08, 1428 tbl.1 (2004) (discussing the media attention given to punitive 
damages awards, the interest of tort reformers, and the rise of “blockbuster” awards 
ranging from $100 million to more than $1 billion). 
17 Jeff Bleich, Michelle Friedland, Dan Powell & Aimee Feinberg, Smoke Signals: 
Philip Morris Provides Yet Another Chapter in the Ongoing Saga of Punitive Damages in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 2007, at 24. 
18 See, e.g., Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness When Awarding Multiple 
Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act By a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 950–
52 (2002). 
19 Bleich et al., supra note 17, at 24. 
20 See generally Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive 
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983) (noting the lack of clear constitutional 
standards in judicial review of punitive damages). 
21 See id. at 290–91; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) 
(“In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded [in punitive damages] is 
limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive.”). 
22 Ansley C. Tillman, Unwarranted Entry: An Examination of the Supreme Court’s 
Decision to Enter the Punitive Damages Arena, 24 REV. LITIG. 473, 494 (2005). 
23 Id. at 494–95. 
 2008] Punitives, Damaged 641 
law power of remittitur.24  In any case, as the authority to impose 
punitive damages stemmed from a state’s own power to punish and 
protect its citizens, the basis for such review was consistently solely a 
matter of state law.25 
In several cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the breadth of 
courts’ authority to review punitive damages swiftly began to change, 
beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Browning-Ferris 
Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. in 1989.26  In that case, a 
defendant in an antitrust action challenged a punitive damage award 
of $6 million under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.27  The Court concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause 
did not apply to punitive damages awards between private parties,28 
but noted concern that an excessively large punitive damages award 
might instead violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.29  Because the appellant in that case had not raised the 
due process issue before either the District Court or the Court of 
Appeals, however, the Court did not consider the question directly 
and ultimately upheld the award.30 
Two years later, the Court confronted the due process issue head-
on for the first time in Pacific Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.31  In 
Haslip, the Court clearly stated its constitutional obligations as related 
to punitive damages review under the Due Process Clause.32  Those 
obligations included both a review of the reasonableness of a punitive 
damages award and the adequateness of judicial guidance to the jury 
because “unlimited jury discretion . . . in the fixing of punitive 
damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional 
sensibilities.”33  Ultimately, the Court stopped short of overturning 
 
24 Id. at 493. 
25 It had long been settled that under the traditional common law approach, a jury’s 
determination to impose an award of punitive damages may be reviewed by appellate 
courts — including the Supreme Court — to ensure that it is reasonable under a rational-
basis review. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991).  The 
Supreme Court, however, has never struck down a punitive damages award between 
private actors on the basis that it was unreasonable. 
26 492 U.S. 257. 
27 See id. 
28 Id. at 264. 
29 Id. at 276. 
30 Id. at 278. 
31 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
32 Id. at 9–12. 
33 Id. at 18 (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)). 
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the punitive damages award at issue in Haslip, finding the state 
court’s application of certain standards had adequately constrained the 
jury’s decision.34  Before closing the issue, however, the Court 
warned that the amount of the award in Haslip —more than four times 
the amount of compensatory damages, and more than 200 times the 
plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses —was “close to the line.”35 
It was not until BMW v. Gore in 1996 that the Court first struck 
down a punitive damages award as excessive on due process 
grounds.36  In BMW, plaintiff Ira Gore Jr. had purchased a new car 
that was, unbeknownst to him, repainted by the distributor to hide 
surface damage that occurred during transit.37  Gore alleged that 
BMW’s failure to disclose that post-manufacture paint job amounted 
to fraud, and a jury awarded him $4000 in compensatory damages.38  
Additionally, the jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages (later 
reduced to $2 million on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court) 
based on evidence that the defendant’s practice was widespread and 
had affected a large number of other BMW consumers.39  Gore 
appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
On review, the Court began by noting its approval of the Alabama 
decision to reduce the award by half, agreeing that the jury had 
improperly based its decision in part upon conduct that had happened 
outside the state.40  Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun 
explained that the punitive damages award could punish more than 
merely BMW’s fraud upon Gore himself, but the state did not “have 
the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it 
occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents.”41  
Having narrowed the scope of the award to reflect only conduct that 
occurred within the state, the Court turned to its greater task: to 
“illuminate ‘the character of the standard that will identify 
unconstitutionally excessive awards’ of punitive damages” in future 
cases.42  To that end, the Court developed an analysis of the potential 
excessiveness of a punitive damages award, which consisted of three 
 
34 Id. at 23–24. 
35 Id. 
36 517 U.S. 559. 
37 Id. at 563. 
38 Id. at 563–64. 
39 Id. at 564. 
40 Id. at 572–73. 
41 Id. at 572–73. 
42 Id. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994)). 
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“guideposts.”43  First, and “[p]erhaps . . . most important,” a 
reviewing court should consider the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct in keeping with the Day court’s command that 
punitive damages “should reflect ‘the enormity of [the] offense.’”44  
In determining that degree of reprehensibility, the Court explained, a 
reviewing court should consider several aggravating factors such as 
violence,45 trickery or deceit,46 or an “indifference to or reckless 
disregard for the health and safety of others.”47  Second, a court 
should require a “reasonable relationship” (often called the “ratio 
test”) between a punitive damages award and “the actual harm 
inflicted on the plaintiff.”48  Third and finally, a court should take into 
consideration any disparity between the sanction imposed and civil 
penalties authorized or imposed in similar cases.49 
Applying these factors in BMW, the Supreme Court came to 
several conclusions.  As to reprehensibility, the Court concluded that 
BMW’s actions exhibited “none of the circumstances ordinarily 
associated with egregiously improper conduct.”50  Furthermore, the 
500-to-1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages awarded 
to the plaintiff was “dramatically greater” than those the Court had 
considered reasonable in prior cases.51  Finally, the Court noted the 
massive disparity between the punitive and compensatory damages 
awards and the very small civil sanctions possible.52  Finding that 
each of the guideposts weighed in favor of excessiveness, the Court 
reversed the award as a violation of the defendant’s right to due 
process.53 
Seven years later, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Campbell, the Court revisited and clarified the BMW framework, 
again striking down a jury’s punitive damages award on due process 
grounds. 54  In State Farm, a jury had awarded $2.6 million in 
 
43 Id. at 574. 
44 Id. at 575 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851)). 
45 Id. at 576 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983)). 
46 Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 580–81. 
49 Id. at 583–84. 
50 Id. at 580. 
51 Id. at 581–82. 
52 Id. at 583–85. 
53 Id. at 585–86. 
54 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages against 
State Farm Insurance for wrongfully failing to pay claims against a 
policyholder.55  The Court adhered to the three guidepost analysis set 
out in BMW, and narrowed the first of those guideposts — the degree 
of reprehensibility — to five discrete factors: (1) whether the harm 
caused was physical as opposed to economic; (2) whether the target 
of the conduct was financially vulnerable; (3) whether the conduct 
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; (4) whether the 
harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, as opposed 
to mere accident; and (5) whether the harm evinced an indifference to 
or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others.56  In 
evaluating the facts under its clarified guideposts, the Court curtly 
declared the case “neither close nor difficult,”57 and struck down the 
jury’s punitive damages award as “neither reasonable nor 
proportionate to the wrong committed.”58 
Among the most salient points the Court raised in its discussion of 
the case was the geographic limitation first explored in BMW.  While 
the Court adhered to its command that determining a defendant’s 
reprehensibility should include consideration of whether “the tortious 
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the 
health or safety of others,” the Court also made it clear that a court 
cannot, under the auspices of a punitive damages award, punish a 
defendant for conduct to third parties outside the state.59  In arriving 
at an appropriate punitive damages award, the state court jury in State 
Farm had relied heavily upon the statistical probability that the 
defendant would be punished in fewer than one of every 50,000 
instances of similar conduct across the country.60  The Supreme 
Court, citing BMW, scolded the state court for using the case “as a 
platform to expose, and punish,” State Farm’s nationwide policies 
rather than specifically for its conduct directed toward the plaintiff.61  
Relying upon fundamental tenets of federalism as its support, the 
Court made a point of stating clearly, as it had in BMW, that a state 
 
55 Id. at 415. 
56 Id. at 419 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 576–77). 
57 Id. at 418. 
58 Id. at 429. 
59 Id. at 419–20. 
60 Id. at 426. 
61 Id. at 420. 
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has no power to impose its own judgment upon a defendant’s actions 
in other states.62 
Crucially, however, the Court did not go so far as to altogether 
prohibit evidence that a defendant’s harm extended to third parties 
outside the state.  Instead, the Court merely limited the use of such 
evidence to demonstrate “the deliberateness and culpability” of the 
defendant’s action.63  Further, the Court required that such conduct 
“have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff” to ensure 
a defendant is not simply punished for being an unsavory 
individual.64  The likelihood that other instances of a defendant’s 
conduct will generally go unpunished, the Court explained, was 
simply not a legitimate basis upon which to determine an award of 
punitive damages.  As the Court stated, “[d]ue process does not 
permit courts . . . to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ 
hypothetical claims against a defendant.”65  The Court further stated 
that “[a]lthough evidence of other acts need not be identical to have 
relevance in the calculation of punitive damages,”66 “[a] defendant’s 
dissimilar acts . . . may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.”67  
Thus, evidence of the defendant’s conduct toward third parties could 
serve as a basis to determine punitive damages, but only conduct 
similar and relevant to the harm suffered by the plaintiff and only in a 
manner that dealt with the “deliberateness and culpability”68 of the 
conduct at issue. 
Turning to the remainder of the BMW analysis, the Court held that 
although no bright-line ratio would be required, “few awards 
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages”69 would satisfy due process, and there was doubtless a 
“presumption against” a 145-to-1 ratio.70  Furthermore, the Court 
noted, the $145 million punitive damages award was overwhelmingly 
greater than the state’s nearest relevant criminal penalty of $10,000.71  
The Court determined the award to be “an irrational and arbitrary 
 
62 Id. at 420–22. 
63 Id. at 422. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 423 (emphasis added). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 422–23. 
68 Id. at 422. 
69 Id. at 425. 
70 Id. at 426. 
71 Id. at 428. 
 646 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 637 
deprivation of the property of the defendant” in violation of the Due 
Process Clause and reversed the state court’s decision.72 
After State Farm, analysts and academics focused primarily on the 
Court’s pronouncement favoring single-digit ratios.  Several law 
review articles speculated as to whether the Court had, in effect, 
imposed a de facto 9-to-1 limit upon punitive damages.73  But State 
Farm’s quieter holding concerning harm to third parties raised a more 
critical question: if the Court prohibited a punitive damage award 
based on the defendant’s “lawful out-of-state conduct” or “dissimilar 
acts,” could a state allow punitive damages for similar acts done 
against others within the same state?  BMW v. Gore seemed to 
suggest the answer should be yes; although the Alabama jury in that 
case could not base its punitive damages award upon BMW’s similar 
conduct in other states, the Court remarked in a footnote that “the 
error-free portion of the jury verdict” could be reached by multiplying 
the harm done to each vehicle by the number of repainted vehicles 
sold within the state.74  And as the Court had recognized in several 
cases preceding BMW, “the existence and frequency of similar past 
conduct” is a typical and legitimate consideration in assessing 
punitive damages.75  On the other hand, however, the Court expressly 
stated in State Farm that the Due Process Clause prohibits a court 
from “adjudicat[ing] the merits of other parties’ hypothetical 
claims.”76  Considering a defendant’s harm to others, it seemed, was 
simultaneously prohibited and “error free.”  Through apparently 
inconsistent language, the Court uncovered a surprisingly complex 
aspect of punitive damages: in determining an appropriate punitive 
damage award, how is a jury to treat a defendant’s conduct to those 
other than the plaintiff? 
 
72 Id. at 429. 
73 See, e.g., Andrew C.W. Lund, The Road from Nowhere? Punitive Damage Ratios 
After BMW v. Gore and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 20 
TOURO L. REV. 943 (2005). 
74 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567–68 n.11 (1996). 
75 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) (quoting 
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991). 
76 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003). 
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II 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF PHILIP MORRIS V. WILLIAMS 
The questions raised by State Farm engendered a great deal of 
litigation.77  As a result, two outcomes were expected when the Court 
in 2006 granted certiorari in Philip Morris v. Williams.  First, many 
foresaw further development in the BMW/State Farm substantive due 
process analysis, particularly with regard to the Court’s “ratio” 
standard.78  Second, many hoped for a clarification of the issues of 
harm to nonparties raised by both BMW and State Farm.79  As it 
turned out, the former concern was not addressed at all—and the latter 
was made only more confounding.80 
A.  Philip Morris: The Factual and Procedural Background 
Philip Morris v. Williams arose out of the death of Jesse Williams, 
a heavy smoker whose surviving spouse brought claims for 
negligence and deceit against the manufacturer of Williams’ favored 
cigarette.81  Mrs. Williams asserted that Philip Morris, over the course 
of forty years, had knowingly and falsely led Mr. Williams to believe 
smoking was safe — a belief she contended ultimately led to his 
death.82  Mrs. Williams alleged Philip Morris’s conduct amounted to 
deceit and sought both compensatory and punitive damages.83  The 
jury found for Mrs. Williams and awarded compensatory damages of 
approximately $821,000 and punitive damages of $79.5 million.84 
The subsequent procedural history is uniquely convoluted.  After 
reviewing the jury verdict, the trial judge found the $79.5 million 
punitive damages award “excessive” under BMW v. Gore and reduced 
the award to $32 million.85  On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
 
77 Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, TRIAL, May 2007, at 
72. 
78 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Weigh Award in a Smoker’s Death, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at C3; Bloomberg.com, Philip Morris Punitive Damages Get 
High Court Hearing, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 30, 2006, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aYpnGewZ1NUY. 
79 See id. 
80 See Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
81 Id. at 1060. 
82 See id. at 1060–61. 
83 Id. at 1060–61. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
 648 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 637 
restored the award of $79.5 million, concluding the trial court should 
not have reduced the jury’s measure of appropriate punitive 
damages.86  After unsuccessfully seeking review in the Oregon 
Supreme Court, Philip Morris was then granted certiorari by the U.S. 
Supreme Court,87 which remanded the case for further proceedings in 
light of its then-recent decision in State Farm v. Campbell.88  
Bolstered by what appeared to be a new 9-to-1 ceiling on punitive 
damages awards, Philip Morris returned to the Oregon courts to argue 
that its sanction — at nearly 100 times Williams’s compensatory 
damages award —was “grossly excessive.”89 
On remand, Philip Morris then supplemented its argument for 
excessiveness with a second assignment of error culled from State 
Farm, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct 
the jury concerning what it could and could not do with regard to the 
defendant’s conduct toward those not represented in court.90  At trial, 
Philip Morris had submitted to the court its “Proposed Jury 
Instruction No. 34,” an instruction that purported to explain to the 
jury the difference between permissible and impermissible 
considerations of the harm defendant’s conduct allegedly caused to 
nonparties.91 The proposed jury instruction, in relevant part, stated: 
 The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable 
relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Williams by the defendant’s 
punishable misconduct.  Although you may consider the extent of 
harm suffered by others in determining what that reasonable 
relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of 
its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of 
their own in which other juries can resolve their claims and award 
punitive damages for those harms, as such other juries see fit.92 
Although the trial court did incorporate concepts from Philip 
Morris’s proposed instruction into its final jury instructions, the 
“court did not give proposed jury instruction No. 34 in the form in 
which Philip Morris proffered it.”93  That decision, Philip Morris now 
 
86 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 182 Or. App. 44, 72, adh’d to on recons., 183 Or. 
App. 192 (2002). 
87 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062. 
88 See id. at 1065. 
89 See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45 (2008). 
90 Id. at 55. 
91 Id. at 50. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 50–51 n.1. 
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argued, constituted reversible error under State Farm.94  After State 
Farm, they asserted, courts were prohibited from imposing punitive 
damages awards based upon punishment for harm caused to 
nonparties; the trial court’s decision not to give Philip Morris’s 
proffered jury instruction, they argued, created a risk that the jury did 
exactly that.95 
The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court 
successively rejected Philip Morris’s argument.96  As the Oregon 
Supreme Court noted, State Farm had not explicitly held that a jury 
cannot punish for the harm caused to others.97  Instead, it had merely 
held that a jury could not base its award upon a defendant’s dissimilar 
acts.98  Regardless of whether the jury in Philip Morris had in fact 
considered the defendant’s similar acts to other individuals, the 
Oregon Supreme Court would not force upon them a jury instruction 
that represented a different standard than that which it read in State 
Farm.  The Oregon Supreme Court went on to note the confusion that 
would result if Philip Morris’s reading of the law were accurate: “[i]f 
a jury cannot punish for the conduct [to nonparties], then it is difficult 
to see why it may consider it at all.”99  Further, the court stated that 
“[i]t is unclear . . . how a jury could ‘consider’ harm to others, yet 
withhold that consideration from the punishment calculus.”100  The 
Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed the punitive damages award, and, 
as was to be expected, Philip Morris once again appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.101 
The U.S. Supreme Court, likely perceiving the complexity that 
nonparty harm brought to the BMW/State Farm due process analysis, 
granted certiorari.102  As Philip Morris had argued in its appeal to the 
Oregon courts, the trial court’s asserted error lay in its refusal to give 
Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction, presenting the risk that a 
portion of the $79.5 million award represented punishment for its 
 
94 Id. at 52. 
95 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064. 
96 Id. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 1065. 
99 Id. at 1064–65 (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 340 Or. 35, 52 (2006)) 
(emphasis added) (first alteration original). 
100 Id. at 1065 (quoting Williams, 340 Or. at 52) (first alteration original). 
101 Id. at 1062. 
102 Id. 
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harm to others — a punishment Philip Morris argued the Due Process 
clause would forbid.103 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion 
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court narrowly agreed with Philip Morris, 
reversing the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision and remanding the 
case for further proceedings.104  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Breyer stated that “[i]n our view, the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a 
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom 
they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, 
essentially, strangers to the litigation.”105  To hold otherwise, Breyer 
wrote, would present two problems of constitutional import.  First, to 
permit a state to punish a defendant for harm it inflicted upon other 
unidentified individuals who did not participate in the lawsuit would 
deprive the defendant of its constitutionally protected right to “present 
every available defense.”106  Second, permitting punishment for 
injury to a nonparty victim would require speculation on the part of 
the jury as to the extent, number, and circumstances of those 
injuries.107  Such speculation produces constitutionally impermissible 
risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice to the 
defendant.108  To avoid such risks, the Court held, a jury may not use 
punitive damages to punish a defendant for the harm caused others.109  
Recognizing the inconsistency of its earlier language on this point in 
BMW and State Farm, the Court conceded that it had never before 
explicitly held that a jury may not punish for the harm a defendant 
causes to out-of-court third parties.110  But, the Court concluded, “we 
do so hold now.” 111 
 
103 Id. at 1061.  Philip Morris also argued that the punitive damages award was “grossly 
excessive,” as the nearly 100-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages far 
exceeded the single-digit multiplier rule implied in State Farm.  However, having resolved 
the case on other grounds, the Court never reached the issue.  Id. at 1065. 
104 See id. 
105 Id. at 1063. 
106 Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 1063–65. 
111 Id. at 1065. 
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As alluringly clear as that language seemed, only three paragraphs 
later the Court added a considerably more complex facet to its 
analysis: 
 [Williams] argues that she is free to show harm to other victims 
because it is relevant to a different part of the punitive damages 
constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility.  That is to say, 
harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.  Philip Morris, in 
turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order 
to demonstrate reprehensibility.  Nor do we.  Evidence of actual 
harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed 
the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general 
public, and so was particularly reprehensible . . . .112 
In other words, there is only one appropriate way in which a jury can 
consider harm to nonparties in its determination of a punitive 
damages award.  A jury may consider evidence of harm to nonparties 
in its determination of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, 
but may not use that evidence to punish a defendant directly for the 
harm it is alleged to have caused. 
As a theoretical distinction, the line the Court drew was perhaps a 
viable one.  But as the Oregon Supreme Court recognized in its 
opinion on Philip Morris’s second appeal, the prospect of applying 
such a nuanced standard to an actual jury’s decision-making process 
raised some vexing questions.  First, since the Court has described 
reprehensibility as the “most important” factor in determining the size 
of a punitive damages award,113 how is a jury to consider harm to 
nonparties in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct yet withhold that consideration from its overall calculation of 
how large that punishment should be?  Second, once a jury has 
awarded punitive damages, how could a reviewing court determine 
whether that jury “considered” such nonparty harm solely within the 
rubric of reprehensibility, rather than in seeking to punish the 
defendant directly?  The Supreme Court’s response, if not altogether 
circuitous, was less than helpful: “Our answer is that state courts 
cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and 
unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring.”114  Where such a 
risk exists, the Court continued, a state court must protect against that 
 
112 Id. at 1063–64. 
113 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). 
114 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065. 
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risk upon a party’s request.115  Presumably — although the court did 
not expressly say so — such “protection” would come in the form of 
an adequately illuminating jury instruction. 
Having announced its new rule and the reasoning upon which it 
was based, the Court then applied those principles to the jury 
instructions given in the case at hand.  The Court explained that “[t]he 
instruction that Philip Morris said the trial court should have given 
distinguishes between using harm to others as part of the ‘reasonable 
relationship’ equation (which it would allow) and using it directly as a 
basis for punishment.”116  The Oregon Supreme Court, on the other 
hand, permitted some measure of direct punishment for harm to 
others and thus “applied the wrong constitutional standard” when 
considering Philip Morris’s appeal.117  The Court thus vacated the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion and remanded for further 
proceedings in accord with its new rule.118 
C.  The Dissents 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Alito 
joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.119  Justices Stevens, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg filed separate dissenting opinions, and Justice 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1064. 
117 Id. at 1065. 
118 On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the punitive damages award, but 
did so for reasons unrelated to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion.  See Williams v. Philip 
Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45 (2008).  Under Oregon law, an appellate court will not reverse a 
trial court’s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction unless the proposed instruction is 
“clear and correct in all respects” and “altogether free from error.”  Beglau v. Albertus, 
272 Or. 170, 179 (1975); see also Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or. 99, 106 
(1998) (“[T]here is no error [in refusing to give a proposed instruction] if the requested 
instruction is not correct in all respects.”).  Because the Oregon Supreme Court on remand 
found Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction contained several misstatements of Oregon 
law unrelated to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion, it held that the trial court’s refusal to 
give Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction did not constitute reversible error.  Philip 
Morris, 344 Or. at 59–60.  The court did not reach the due process question.  See id. at 55–
56.  It’s worth noting that, despite the unusually tangled and protracted procedural history 
of the Philip Morris litigation, the story may not yet be over.  Although a state court 
decision “based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds” will no 
longer be subject to U.S. Supreme Court review, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 
(1983), the parties have returned to the U.S. Supreme Court a third time to determine 
whether the Oregon court’s decision was indeed based upon “adequate and independent” 
state grounds, see Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008) (granting 
certiorari). 
119 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1060. 
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Scalia joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.120  Justice Stevens disagreed 
with the Court’s holding that juries could not consider harm to 
nonparties when punishing a defendant’s conduct because, he 
contended, public harm is the sine qua non of punitive damages.121  
There is “no reason why an interest in punishing a wrongdoer ‘for 
harming persons who are not before the court,’ should not be taken 
into consideration when assessing the appropriate sanction for 
reprehensible conduct,”122 Justice Stevens wrote, because punitive 
damages are by definition “a sanction for the public harm the 
defendant’s conduct has caused or threatened.”123 
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, did not take issue with the Court’s 
substantive conclusion, agreeing that “when punitive damages are at 
issue, a jury is properly instructed to consider the extent of harm 
suffered by others as a measure of reprehensibility, but not to mete 
out punishment for injuries in fact sustained by nonparties.”124  But, 
she contended, “[t]he Oregon courts did not rule otherwise.”125  
Because the majority failed to identify any specific element of the 
Oregon court’s opinion that contradicted the majority’s rule, Justice 
Ginsburg concluded that vacating the Oregon court’s judgment was 
unwarranted.126 
Justice Thomas, joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in full, also 
wrote separately to reiterate the view he had taken in State Farm that 
“the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages 
awards.”127 
III 
THE COURT’S PROBLEMATIC NEWFOUND RULE 
Although the Court in Philip Morris strove to clear up the 
confusion in BMW and State Farm regarding harm to nonparties, the 
Court’s opinion appears to present more problems than it resolves.  
Ultimately, the deficiency of the Philip Morris standard boils down to 
 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 1066–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
123 Id. (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
125 Id. 
126 See id. at 1068–69. 
127 Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429–30 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
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three principal flaws.  First, the Court’s distinction is illusory.  A 
meaningful distinction cannot be made between juror determinations 
of reprehensibility and determinations of the amount of punitive 
damages because the size of an appropriate punitive damages award 
depends primarily on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.  
Second, even if such a distinction could be made, the Court’s standard 
is based upon such delicate nuance that a jury is unlikely to 
understand or employ it effectively.  Third, even if a jury is to 
understand and properly employ the Court’s narrow distinction, it will 
not matter because that standard does not accomplish the objectives 
the Court has stated are necessary to comport with the Due Process 
Clause.  This Comment examines each point separately. 
A.  The Court’s Standard Is Illusory 
The most immediate problem with the Philip Morris standard is 
one of logical inconsistency.  Put simply, the Court cannot 
meaningfully distinguish the use of nonparty injury in determining 
reprehensibility and punishment when determining punishment 
depends predominantly upon a determination of reprehensibility. 
Under the Court’s new standard, jurors are allowed to consider 
injury to nonparties when determining the reprehensibility of a 
defendant’s conduct.128  The Court, in turn, has repeatedly stated that 
reprehensibility is the single most important factor in determining the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award under its substantive due 
process review.129  A jury, then, should appropriately consider the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct when determining the 
amount of punitive damages to assess.  Ultimately, the Court has thus 
asked a jury to consider injuries to nonparties when determining 
reprehensibility and to consider reprehensibility when determining the 
size of the punitive damages award.  The problem, however, is that 
the Court has then prohibited the jury from considering injuries to 
nonparties when determining total punitive damages.  Stated another 
way, the jury is to consider fact A to answer question B, then look to 
the answer to question B in order to make its final determination C.  
At the same time, however, the jury is prohibited from basing its final 
determination C upon that same fact A. 
 
128 Id. at 1063–64. 
129 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). 
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Beyond being an altogether confusing tangle of rules — a separate 
problem, discussed below — the Court’s standard asks a jury to 
perform a logical impossibility.  If jurors consider injury to nonparties 
in the process of determining reprehensibility, and if, at the same 
time, they consider reprehensibility to determine the amount of 
punitive damages to impose, jurors unavoidably will have considered 
injury to nonparties when determining the total punitive damages 
award.  This is precisely what Philip Morris forbids.  Thus, to follow 
the Court’s standard in any case in which an out-of-court individual 
has been injured, a jury must do exactly what the Court has held the 
Due Process Clause does not permit.  Justice Stevens, in dissent, 
noted this fundamental inconsistency: “When a jury increases a 
punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition 
punishing the defendant— d irectly — for third party harm. . . . The 
Court endorses a contrary conclusion without providing us with any 
reasoned justification.”130  Put simply, one way or another, a jury 
following Philip Morris will have to consider injury to nonparties in 
order to reach a constitutionally appropriate amount of punitive 
damages to award.  For the Court to suggest otherwise is fallacious 
and internally inconsistent. 
B.  The Court’s Standard Will Confuse a Jury 
Whether or not Philip Morris is logically sound, a jury will 
nevertheless receive instructions that reflect its holding.  This 
uncovers a second problem inherent in the Court’s rule: even if there 
is a logical distinction to be made, a jury of ordinary citizens is 
unlikely to understand it.  The dizzying language and nuanced 
distinctions the Court employs to differentiate between legitimate and 
illegitimate means of considering harm to nonparties produce a 
complex rule the jury likely will not grasp. 
Importantly, to argue that a jury is likely to be confused by the 
Philip Morris ruling is not merely a comment upon jurors’ ability to 
understand and properly employ complex legal standards.  Rather, it 
is to argue that the rule itself is too confusing to be useful.  Even 
sophisticated legal minds have responded to the Court’s holding with 
uncertainty.  Justice Stevens’s dissent is particularly telling in this 
respect: 
 
130 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 While apparently recognizing the novelty of its holding, the 
majority relies on a distinction between taking third-party harm into 
account in order to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct —which is permitted — from doing so in order to punish 
the defendant “directly” —w hich is forbidden.  This nuance eludes 
me.131 
Justice Stevens’s dissent is remarkable in that it does not merely 
express disagreement with the line drawn by the majority; rather, his 
language suggests he does not fully understand the distinction the 
majority tries to make.  Similarly, Justice Thomas, dissenting 
separately, called the majority’s rule “confusing.”132  Response to the 
Court’s opinion in Philip Morris among academics and legal theorists 
was equally puzzled and reflected a particular concern for the 
practical application of the Court’s newfound standard.133  Noted 
constitutional theorist Erwin Chemerinsky seemed immediately to 
throw up his hands: 
 How, then, should a jury be instructed?  It can be told that it can 
consider harm to nonparties in assessing the reprehensibility of a 
defendant’s conduct and that reprehensibility is the most important 
factor in determining the size of the punitive damages award.  But 
the jury also must be told that it cannot punish the defendant for 
harm to nonparties.  Perhaps Breyer and the Court’s majority 
understand the theoretical difference here, but it is hard to imagine 
juries comprehending it.134 
In the year since Philip Morris was written, surely several state court 
juries have been tasked with contemplating that “theoretical” 
difference.  Unfortunately, we have no way to determine whether 
those jurors do, in fact, understand the distinction Philip Morris 
demands that they make.  On remand to the Oregon Supreme Court, 
however, the attorneys for Philip Morris and Mrs. Williams had an 
opportunity in September 2007 to present some of the first in-court 
discourse on the Supreme Court’s holding in Philip Morris.  During 
oral argument, William F. Gary, counsel for Petitioner Philip Morris, 
had the following exchange with Chief Justice Paul DeMuniz: 
GARY: [Counsel for the Respondent has] been arguing consistently 
that it’s okay to punish for harm to others, and now [after Philip 
Morris v. Williams] he’s saying there’s no significant risk that the 
jury did so. 
 
131 Id. at 1066–67 (internal citations omitted). 
132 Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
133 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 72. 
134 Id. at 74. 
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C. JUSTICE DEMUNIZ: Well, it’s okay to punish [for harm to 
others] as long as it’s done within the cabin of reprehensibility, isn’t 
that right? 
GARY: No.  And again, this distinction— w hich is important, but 
is, as everybody I think recognizes, is a difficult and elusive 
distinction — [ means] you can consider harm to others, as the 
Supreme Court said in its opinion, because it is evidence that shows 
that the conduct exposed others to a risk of harm.  So it goes to 
reprehensibility.  But you cannot impose punishment for the harm 
that was caused to others.135 
Chief Justice DeMuniz’s comment may have represented a genuine 
confusion about the distinction between “punishing” a defendant and 
merely “considering” nonparty harm within the cabin of 
reprehensibility, or it may have been instead an observation that the 
distinction is dubious to begin with.  In either case, the uncertainty in 
the courtroom among two experienced appellate attorneys and five 
Supreme Court justices was evident.  During that same proceeding, 
Justice Michael Gillette expressed his bewilderment when, discussing 
what was required to ensure that a punitive damages jury instruction 
complied with the Due Process Clause, he commented, “this is a 
situation in which [at trial] most of God’s children still didn’t have 
any idea with respect to what some of the rules were, and I would 
respectfully suggest that some of God’s children still don’t know, me 
among them.”136  By the time that oral argument took place, more 
than six months had passed since the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Philip Morris, and the Oregon court had been presented with several 
briefs offering analyses of its holding.  Nevertheless, many in that 
courtroom — educated lawyers all — still struggled to ascertain just 
what was required of them in order to adhere to the Due Process 
Clause. 
Considering their difficulty, the concern of Chemerinsky and 
others takes on a more alarming dimension: how, then, are we to 
instruct juries?  That is to say not simply “what should we tell jurors,” 
but rather, how are we to expect them to understand it?  The Supreme 
Court’s proffered “answer” that courts simply “cannot authorize 
procedures that create [the] . . . risk of any such confusion 
occurring,”137 is in fact no answer at all when it is the Court’s 
 
135 Audio Compact Disc: Oral Argument of Petitioner, Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 
SC S051805 (Or. Sup. Ct., Sept. 2007) (on file with Oregon State Court Administrator). 
136 Id. 
137 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065. 
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standard itself that is the source of that confusion.  Worse still, jurors 
will generally not have a legal education or a detailed attempt at 
explanation of the Philip Morris standard, as the Oregon Supreme 
Court and many legal theorists have had in their efforts to understand 
the case.  Instead, they will simply have a jury instruction. 
Consider the following scenario: a passenger on a crowded bus is 
severely injured when the bus driver angrily begins to careen and 
swerve recklessly through a congested city street, ultimately causing 
several high-speed collisions.  After an expensive and lengthy 
hospital visit, the passenger files a personal injury suit against the 
driver and his employer, seeking both compensatory and punitive 
damages.  At trial, the jury learns that several dozen bus passengers 
and nearby drivers were also severely injured as a result of the 
driver’s conduct.  The jurors find for the plaintiff and conclude that 
punitive damages are appropriate, having determined that the bus 
driver showed a reckless and outrageous indifference to an 
unreasonable risk of harm and that he acted with a conscious 
indifference to the health, safety, and welfare of others.  The jurors 
are then presented with an instruction identical to that approved by 
the Supreme Court in Philip Morris, stating in relevant part: 
 If you determine that some amount of punitive damages should 
be imposed on the defendant, it will then be your task to set an 
amount that is appropriate. . . . While there is no set formula to be 
applied in reaching an appropriate amount, I will now advise you of 
some of the factors that you may wish to consider in this 
connection. . . . The size of any punishment should bear a 
reasonable relationship to the harm caused to [plaintiff] by the 
defendant’s punishable misconduct.  Although you may consider 
the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that 
reasonable relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant for 
the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may 
bring lawsuits of their own . . . .138 
A juror would likely understand the significance of that instruction 
at its polar ends: on one hand, a defendant who caused harm to many 
is more worthy of punishment than a defendant who harmed only one.  
On the other hand, only the plaintiff’s case is currently before the 
court, and a punitive damages award should thus not represent 
whatever compensatory damages another individual may be entitled 
to.  But between those two extremes lies a wide and perplexing field.  
Faced with the instruction to “consider the extent of harm suffered by 
 
138 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45, 63 (2008). 
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others” when determining how large a defendant’s punishment should 
be, but not to “punish the defendant for its alleged misconduct on 
other persons,” what is a juror to make of evidence that the driver was 
not driving in an empty parking lot, but rather a crowded freeway?  
What will a juror imagine his or her duty to be with respect to 
evidence that the bus was packed with passengers, rather than a single 
rider?  When recalling evidence that the plaintiff’s fellow riders were 
not merely jostled, but were severely injured, what will a juror 
understand to be the practical difference between “considering” the 
extent of those passengers’ injuries when determining punishment and 
actually “punishing” for such injuries?  If indeed there is a 
meaningful difference between the two, the likelihood that a juror will 
be able to discern it seems slim.  If a jury does not properly 
understand or employ that distinction, the Court’s attempt at 
protecting a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause will 
have been altogether ineffective. 
C.  The Court’s Standard Will Not Protect a Defendant’s Due Process 
Rights 
The third problem presented by Philip Morris, though not 
immediately apparent, is perhaps the most troubling.  Even adhering 
to the Court’s standard, a jury may still have every opportunity to 
engage in the speculation and unconstitutional conjecture that gave 
rise to the Court’s due process concerns in the first place.  Even if a 
jury does fully understand and properly employ the majority’s narrow 
distinction between proper and improper use of nonparty harm in a 
punitive damages case, the result is praiseworthy only if that standard 
limits the jury’s discretion in a way that meaningfully protects a 
defendant’s due process rights.  Unfortunately, it may have no such 
effect. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Philip Morris, several dangers 
necessitate procedural due process limitations on a jury’s imposition 
of punitive damages awards.  The first of those dangers concerns a 
defendant’s constitutionally protected “opportunity to present every 
available defense.”139  Generally, a defendant accused of injuring 
another party has the opportunity to present arguments in defense, 
such as a defense of comparative negligence or privilege.  A 
defendant threatened with punishment for injuring an out-of-court 
 
139 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 
(1972)). 
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victim, however, has no opportunity to defend against the charge with 
respect to that (perhaps unknown) individual.  Within the facts of the 
Philip Morris case, for example, the Court remarked that another 
injured smoker may have known that cigarettes were dangerous, or 
may never have relied upon Philip Morris’s statements to the 
contrary.  Though injured by cigarettes, that smoker would not have 
been injured by Philip Morris’s fraud, a fact that breaks the causal 
link necessary to attach liability.  Being a “stranger to the litigation,” 
however, that smoker would never be in court to reveal that crucial 
information.  As a result, the defendant’s opportunity to assert a valid 
defense would be lost.  Using punitive damages to punish a defendant 
for alleged nonparty harm thus creates the dangerous risk that the 
defendant will be deprived of the chance to properly defend itself. 
To avoid that risk, the Court held that the Constitution requires 
“assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong 
one,” and look to nonparty harm not to punish, but “simply to 
determine reprehensibility.”140  What the Court did not explain, 
however, is why allowing a jury to consider harm to nonparties 
presents any less risk to the defendant’s due process rights when it is 
merely used to determine reprehensibility.  So long as a defendant 
may have viable defenses against a nonparty (for example, that the 
defendant’s conduct was not the proximate cause of the nonparty’s 
injury), it is not enough to prohibit a jury from punishing the 
defendant for that injury yet still allow a jury to use that injury to 
indicate the defendant’s culpability.  Stated more simply, if the 
defendant might not be liable for a nonparty’s injury in the first place, 
then the extent of that injury ceases to be a valid basis from which to 
determine reprehensibility. 
If a jury nevertheless takes that individual’s injury into account to 
determine a defendant’s reprehensibility, as the Court suggests, then 
that defendant may be presented with exactly the same due process 
risks the Court ascribes to punishment.  By definition, a nonparty—
the circumstances of whose injuries may remain a mystery — will 
never be before the court to tell his or her story, and, as a result, a 
defendant will never have the opportunity to present whatever 
defenses he may have the right to assert.  Just as punishing a 
defendant for such nonparty harm risks violating the defendant’s due 
process right to assert every available defense, determining 
reprehensibility on the basis of the injuries of a nonparty creates an 
 
140 Id. at 1064. 
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equally impermissible risk to a defendant’s right to procedural due 
process.  So long as the defendant is denied the opportunity to defend 
against allegations of nonparty harm, it should be of no comfort to 
anyone that a jury might use information regarding such harm “only” 
to determine that the defendant is more blameworthy. 
Moreover, where a defendant is not, in fact, at fault for a 
nonparty’s alleged injury— t hough the nonparty may not be present to 
enable the defendant to establish that fact — i mposing punitive 
damages for that harm introduces substantive unfairness in addition to 
problems of procedural due process. In such a case, regardless of 
whether the nonparty harm is punished directly or merely 
“considered” within the cabin of reprehensibility, the effect of any 
increased award will be to impose a legal penalty upon the defendant 
for wrongs for which it was not legally responsible. 
In either case— w hether or not a defendant was in fact responsible 
for the alleged nonparty harm — the same procedural deficiency 
remains: because the subject of nonparty harm is, by definition, one 
who is not present in the action and is likely unidentified, the jury can 
do little but guess as to the nature and extent of his or her injuries.  It 
was, in fact, just such conjecture on the jury’s part that the Supreme 
Court highlighted as a second principal threat to a defendant’s due 
process rights.  As the Court questioned, “[h]ow many such [out-of-
court] victims are there?  How seriously were they injured?  Under 
what circumstances did injury occur?  The trial will not likely answer 
such questions as to nonparty victims.  The jury will be left to 
speculate.”141  Such speculation, the Court held, “would add a near 
standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation,” 
magnifying the “fundamental due process concerns . . . [of] 
arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of notice” to the defendant.142  The 
jury does not know that nonparty’s story, and if we are to give the 
Due Process Clause any meaning at all, the jury must not be permitted 
to simply guess. 
Crucially, however, that same concern applies whether a jury is 
considering nonparty harm to establish punishment or to determine 
reprehensibility.  For a jury to look to the injuries of an out-of-court 
and possibly unidentified nonparty as a measure of the 
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct requires engaging in exactly 
the same speculative questions the Court held were such a threat to a 
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defendant’s due process rights.  How serious was the harm in 
question?  How many did it befall?  And under what circumstances 
did it occur?  Whether the conclusion the jury ultimately reaches on 
the basis of those questions is that the defendant should be punished 
for its conduct toward nonparties or merely, as the Court suggests, 
“that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial 
risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly 
reprehensible,”143 the threat to due process is the same.  The jury is 
basing its decision to impose punitive damages upon questions it 
likely cannot answer and upon answers that may be altogether 
arbitrary. 
The Court’s distinction between punishing and merely determining 
reprehensibility is thus a far less reliable safeguard of a defendant’s 
due process rights than the language in Philip Morris suggests.  In 
either case, the concurrent risks to the defendant — lack of 
opportunity to assert defenses on one hand, and arbitrariness and 
speculation on the other— s tem from the same fatal procedural flaw: 
the sanction imposed upon the defendant is founded upon the story of 
one who is not there to tell it.  That fundamental procedural 
deficiency is made all the more troubling by the complex and subtle 
nature of the Court’s distinction and by the resulting likelihood that a 
jury will not understand or employ that distinction as the Court 
intends. 
IV 
AFTER PHILIP MORRIS: A SOUNDER APPROACH 
In the wake of Philip Morris, the Supreme Court will be tasked 
with reconciling two opposing principles.  On the one hand, it is 
appropriate to impose greater punitive damages for conduct that 
injures many than for conduct that injures only the plaintiff.  Punitive 
damages exist to punish and deter particularly reprehensible tortious 
acts, and an act that causes harm to many (whether they are ultimately 
present in court or not) is, in the abstract, indisputably more 
reprehensible than an act that causes harm to few.144  On the other 
hand, allowing a jury to freely consider that nonparty harm when 
determining an award of punitive damages presents substantial risks 
to a defendant’s constitutional rights.  As a result of that incongruity, 
 
143 Id. at 1064. 
144 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996)). 
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the Court is left with only two options: it must either impose upon the 
jury a set of sensible and effective constraints —perhaps allowing the 
jury to consider only certain kinds of harm and disallowing others, or 
allowing the jury to consider such harm only for certain purposes and 
not for others— o r else bar the jury’s consideration of nonparty harm 
altogether. 
A.  The Deficiencies of Other Recently Proposed Solutions 
The rule set out in Philip Morris represents an attempt at a system 
of sensible and effective constraints.  But as this Comment illustrates, 
that standard is neither sensible nor effective.  In the year since the 
Court’s opinion in Philip Morris, several legal scholars have proposed 
other standards to constrain a jury’s discretion in imposing punitive 
damages.  A brief analysis shows that those proposed standards, too, 
suffer from critical deficiencies. 
One recently proposed standard, for example, relies on a distinction 
between actual harm to third parties and harm that is merely a 
potential result of the defendant’s conduct.145  That proposal 
comprises two parts.  First, jurors would be altogether prohibited from 
considering actual harm to out-of-court third parties for many of the 
same reasons the Supreme Court cited in Philip Morris.146  Second, in 
contrast to Philip Morris, jurors would be allowed to consider the 
potential harm a defendant’s conduct could have caused because 
states allegedly “must be allowed to consider potential injury to 
nonparties if they are to effectively punish and deter reprehensible 
conduct.”147  That approach, unfortunately, solves one due process 
concern at the expense of another.  Prohibiting a jury from 
considering actual harm to nonparties does effectively prevent a court 
from “adjudicat[ing] the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims,” 
in accord with both State Farm and Philip Morris.148  However, 
another substantial concern of the Philip Morris Court was the danger 
of a rule that would permit jury speculation as to the extent, number, 
and circumstances of nonparty injuries.149  Such speculation, the 
 
145 Daniel Sulser Agle, Working the Unworkable Rule Established in Philip Morris: 
Acknowledging the Difference Between Actual and Potential Injury to Nonparties, 2007 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1317, 1353 (2007). 
146 See id. 
147 Id. at 1356. 
148 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. 
149 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
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Court held, produces constitutionally impermissible risks of 
arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice to a defendant.150  To 
allow a jury to punish a defendant for third party harm that merely 
could have occurred, as that standard suggests, would only encourage 
such unbridled speculation and would thereby exacerbate the threat to 
a defendant’s due process rights.  Furthermore, concerns of the 
defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to present every 
available defense would be similarly magnified, since a defendant 
could not possibly defend against harm that only potentially could 
have taken place. 
A second proposed standard suggests a “Prior Adjudication Rule” 
based primarily upon the distinction between harm to third parties 
who have already asserted their rights in court and those who have 
not.151  That standard would allow a jury to consider third party harm 
when determining an appropriate punitive damages award, but only to 
the extent such harm has been litigated to its conclusion with a 
finding against the defendant.152 Such a standard would address the 
concern of a defendant’s right to present every available defense 
because “[i]n previously adjudicated cases, the defendant had an 
opportunity to assert the applicable defenses, thus satisfying due 
process considerations.”153  In addition, such previously litigated 
third party harm will be clearly defined, eliminating concerns of 
unchecked jury speculation. 
Again, however, such a standard addresses certain threats to a 
defendant’s due process rights at the expense of compounding 
another.  Here, employing a “prior adjudication rule” increases the 
risk of duplicative punishment against a single defendant in 
successive trials.  The principal reason a jury is forbidden from 
adjudicating the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims is 
because doing so “creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages 
awards for the same conduct,”154 which violates due process.  
Allowing a jury to consider third party harm only to the extent such 
harm has been “fully litigated to its conclusion” would encourage 
such duplicative awards, since, by definition, any corresponding 
increase in the punishment the jury assesses will have already been 
 
150 Id. 
151 Ben Figa, The New Due Process Limitation in Philip Morris: A Critique and an 
Alternative Rule Based on Prior Adjudication, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 179, 192 (2007). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 193–94. 
154 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. 
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imposed in full against the defendant in a previous suit.  A standard 
that thus encourages duplicative punishment cannot be employed 
without impermissible risks to a defendant’s due process rights. 
B.  A Proposed Solution: Prohibit a Jury’s Consideration of Nonparty 
Harm Altogether 
Out of twenty years of punitive damages jurisprudence culminating 
with Philip Morris, an incontrovertible principle has emerged: the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution forbids a jury to punish a 
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties.155  Attempts to 
qualify that principle with complex instructions regarding the jury’s 
discretion — consider, but do not punish; or, consider and punish for 
harm that could happen, but not conduct which in fact happened; or, 
consider and punish, but only to the extent that another plaintiff has 
done so already — all appear to be both futile and unhelpful.  Such 
constraints are either too complex to be practical or are insufficiently 
protective of due process rights to be of any legal benefit. 
In addition to such problems of design, attempts to direct the jury 
regarding its calculation of punitive damages may also be inherently 
ineffective.  Empirical research suggests that, due to a low level of 
comprehension and recall by jurors, jury instructions have little 
impact on how juries compute punitive damages awards.156  As others 
have noted, that research suggests it is far less effective to instruct a 
jury on how to consider certain evidence than it is to prevent the jury 
from hearing that evidence altogether.157  The most promising 
solution, then, may be the simplest: a jury should be prohibited from 
imposing punitive damages for a defendant’s injury to nonparties for 
any purpose.  A jury would thus be limited to imposing punitive 
damages for the harm inflicted upon parties to the action.  
Accordingly, a jury may consider harm in its reprehensibility analysis 
only to the extent that the harm is to parties to the action. 
Adopting such a rule presents significant advantages over the 
approach in Philip Morris.  First, such a rule is logical and easily 
comprehensible by a jury.  Jurors who are directed not to base an 
award of punitive damages in any way upon the defendant’s harm to 
 
155 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
156 CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 223 (2002) 
(“Our empirical studies demonstrate that jury instructions do not play a governing role in 
jurors’ decisions concerning liability for punitive damages.”). 
157 Figa, supra note 151, at 191–92. 
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nonparties will not be faced with drawing complex theoretical 
distinctions or adhering to a confusing tangle of rules.  Rather, they 
will be presented with a straightforward and clear instruction.  As a 
result, jurors will more likely faithfully perform their duties in 
accordance with the jury instructions they are given. 
Moreover, such a complete prohibition indisputably affords greater 
protections to a defendant’s due process rights.  Limiting a jury’s 
consideration to only those who are parties to the action ensures that a 
defendant will have the opportunity to assert every available defense.  
Thus limited, a jury will have no reason to engage in speculation as to 
the cause, number, and nature of the injuries for which a defendant is 
to be punished; the only harm relevant to the jury’s calculation will be 
clearly defined by evidence presented in court. 
To argue that barring consideration of nonparty harm is an 
approach both easily understood and constitutionally benign, 
however, is too easy, and is not enough to establish that such an 
approach is sounder than that commanded by the Supreme Court in 
Philip Morris.  The more important assessment lies in determining 
whether a complete bar to considering nonparty harm leaves the 
purpose of a punitive damages award intact.  Could an award of 
punitive damages, so restricted in its calculation as to effectively 
disregard nonparty harm, still remain faithful to the principle that 
harm to many is more reprehensible and thus more deserving of 
greater punishment? 
The answer is twofold.  First, punitive damages in a private civil 
case properly function to punish private civil wrongs.158  As such, 
 
158 Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages As 
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 590 (2003).  This view 
is not universally held.  Many in the legal community—Justice Stevens among them—
adhere to the notion that punitive damages exist to punish the defendant for the entirety of 
the harm committed upon society.  See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1066.  That view, 
however, is legally untenable and historically inaccurate.  As Professor Colby has noted, 
Many of the bedrock principles of punitive damages law — such as the rule that 
the plaintiff must prevail on an underlying civil cause of action in order to 
recover punitive damages, the requirement that the amount of punitive damages 
must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of compensatory damages, and 
the fact that [in most states] the punitive damages are paid to the plaintiff — are 
impossible to reconcile with an understanding of punitive damages as 
punishment for public wrongs. 
 . . . [Moreover], historically, courts understood punitive damages to be 
punishment not for the wrongful act (and all societal consequences thereof), but 
rather for the distinct legal wrong done to the individual plaintiff. 
Colby, supra, at 590. 
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when a defendant’s tortious conduct toward the plaintiff also results 
in tortious conduct toward an out-of-court nonparty, the proper 
remedy for that nonparty’s injury is the award of compensatory and 
punitive damages if and when that nonparty elects to assert its rights 
in court.  If a defendant’s tortious conduct affects a great number of 
individuals, the defendant will naturally be exposed to a greater 
number of legal actions— a nd thus greater damages — than if he had 
harmed only one.159 
Second, if such other injured individuals elect not to assert their 
rights in court—causing the total amount of punitive damages 
imposed upon a defendant to fall short of what it might otherwise 
be — the defendant’s constitutional right to due process must trump an 
existing plaintiff’s desire to correct that punishment by imposing 
damages for their harm.  Put simply, any such “shortfall” in punitive 
damages represents a fundamental conflict between the need to 
impose an award sufficient to punish and deter on one hand, and the 
defendant’s constitutional right to due process on the other.  To the 
extent such a direct conflict exists, the defendant’s constitutional 
rights must prevail. 
Certainly, adopting such an approach requires bringing about a 
significant change in modern punitive damages practice.  At the 
outset, it means narrowing the Supreme Court’s five factors of 
reprehensibility to four.  Determining the reprehensibility of a 
defendant’s tortious act would thus involve considering whether the 
plaintiff’s harm was physical as opposed to economic; whether the 
plaintiff was financially vulnerable; whether the defendant’s conduct 
involved repeated actions toward the plaintiff or was a mere isolated 
incident; and whether the plaintiff’s harm was the result of intentional 
malice, trickery, or deceit, as opposed to mere accident.  The 
defendant’s apparent regard (or lack thereof) for the safety of those 
other than the plaintiff would no longer be considered. Although that 
disregard may make the defendant’s course of conduct more 
reprehensible in a broader sense, it tells a court nothing about the 
blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff. 
 
159 While the defendant’s conduct in such a case would clearly be more reprehensible in 
an abstract sense, it would be no more reprehensible with respect to the plaintiff.  It is that 
injury to the plaintiff —not the abstract reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, nor its 
effect on society— t hat forms the basis for any civil action and any damages that arise 
therefrom.  Moreover, if the defendant’s tortious conduct evinces a disregard for public 
safety — such as the reckless bus driver in the example above — such reckless disregard 
may properly be pursued in a criminal action. 
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Ultimately, it is that narrowing in focus—from punishment for a 
defendant’s entire course of conduct and whatever public harm it 
caused, to punishment for only the act that caused the plaintiff’s 
injury—that underlies the change in approach suggested here. 
Contrary to Justice Stevens’s dissent in Philip Morris, punitive 
damages should not be a sanction for the public harm a defendant’s 
conduct has caused or threatened.  Rather, punitive damages are a 
punishment for a defendant’s injurious act toward a plaintiff, where 
that act is, in the words of the Day Court, so “wanton and malicious” 
or “gross and outrageous” that compensatory damages alone are 
insufficient.  Accordingly, a jury must neither punish nor merely 
“consider” nonparty harm when imposing an award of punitive 
damages. 
That change is neither simple nor easy to effect.  But it presents 
significant advantages over the unworkable standard set forth in 
Philip Morris by affording greater protection to a defendant’s 
constitutional rights, by providing a jury with clear and effective 
direction in its determination of an appropriate punitive damages 
award, and by helping to refocus punitive damages to their proper 
scope. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Troublesome as the Supreme Court’s newfound standard is, Philip 
Morris is certainly not the last word on punitive damages review.  
Rather, it is merely the latest in a line of cases comprising a decades-
long attempt to answer a deceptively simple question: how shall we 
impose punitive damages in a manner that is fair and constitutional?  
Surely the state has a legitimate interest in punishing and deterring 
reprehensible misconduct; at the same time, defendants faced with 
punitive damages awards must be afforded certain constitutional 
protections.  Although the Supreme Court’s attempt to balance those 
competing considerations has thus far been flawed, the Court will 
certainly have the opportunity to rework and clarify its approach to 
third party harm in future punitive damages cases.  When that 
opportunity arises, the Court must heed the practical and 
constitutional difficulties its current rule presents and adopt in its 
place a rule consistent with Philip Morris’s bedrock principle: the 
Due Process Clause forbids a jury to punish a defendant for injury 
that it inflicts upon nonparties.  Until such a rule is adopted by the 
Court, the constitutional and practical deficiencies of the Philip 
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Morris rule will continue to confound jurors and jurists alike—and 
will continue to threaten the very due process rights that rule stands to 
protect. 
 
 
